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mark v.

Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
Plaintiff brought an action alleging negligence, breach of implied
warranty, and breach of express warranty as a result of injuries she
sustained from the application of a permanent wave in defendant's
beauty parlor.' The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the warranty theory of liability was not maintainable because in giving a
permanent wave a beauty parlor is engaged in rendering a service and
not a sale; hence responsibility for injurious results could arise only
from negligence. 2 The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of
New Jersey reversed, 3 holding that the product used in the service of
applying a permanent wave in a beauty shop is subject to the implied
warranty of fitness for particular purpose under Section 2-315 of the
Uniform Commercial Code; 4 and, since the jury could have found the
product to be defective, the beauty parlor operator may be subject to
liability. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the judgment of
the Appellate Division and remanded the cause for a new trial.
The liability of manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers for injuries caused by defective products which they sell or supply is well
established. 5 Strict liability in tort and breach of warranty are two
theories upon which relief has been granted in such cases. 6
I

Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
2 The opinion of the trial court is unreported.
3 Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (App. Div. 1968).
4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-315 (hereinafter cited as U.C.C.). Where the seller
at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods
are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose (N.J. STAT. ANN. 12A:2-315
(1962)).

5 See, e.g., Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp. v. Spelce, 195 Ark. 407, 113 S.W.2d 476 (1938);
Davis v. Williams, 58 Ga. App. 274, 198 S.E. 357 (1938); Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390,
225 N.W. 395 (1929); Simon v. Graham Bakery, 31 N.J. Super. 117, 105 A.2d 877 (App.
Div. 1954); Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 176 N.C. 256, 97 S.E. 27 (1918);
Highland Pharmacy v. White, 144 Va. 106, 131 S.E. 198 (1926).
6 A warranty is an obligation undertaken by a manufacturer or seller under which he
insures that his product will conform to his representations. There are two kinds of warranties: express and implied. An express warranty arises as the result of a positive
affirmation by the seller or manufacturer to a purchaser while an implied warranty,
although not expressly stated, may be implied by the circumstances surrounding the
transaction. See Mitchell v. Rudasill, 332 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. App. 1960); Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 248-49, 147 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1958). See also I S. WILLISrON,
SALES, § 244 (rev. ed. 1948).
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The courts' traditional association of warranties with the law of
contracts has encumbered products liability law with restrictive sales
rules. 7 Among them are privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant, the requirement of notice and the sanctioning of disclaimers.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's momentous decision in Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.8 removed barriers based on such technicalities. This court held that an implied warranty of fitness attaches to
products sold to the public and that the seller of a defective product is
liable to an ultimate consumer for injuries occasioned by its breach,
irrespective of privity between consumer and seller. Since this decision,
the requirement of privity has been repeatedly overturned. 9
Despite its significance, Henningsen furnished little impetus to the
elimination of the technical requirement of a "sale" in warranty cases.
This requirement has been the principal obstacle to recovery for breach
of implied warranty in the area of service contracts when the rendition
of services predominates and the transfer of personal property is an
incidental feature of the transaction. 10 The courts' dogged adherence
to the proposition that a "sale" must be found before a warranty can
arise has led to the present-day sale-service dichotomy." This courtcreated dichotomy means that where goods are transferred and paid
for as an incident to a predominately service-oriented transaction there
is only a service, not a sale, hence no warranty. Most of these courts do
not analyze the substance of the transaction but merely exclude it by
saying it is a well-recognized rule that a "service" does not give rise to
an implied warranty. 12 The rationale is that the elements which give
rise to liability without fault are lacking in the case of professional
services. This reasoning, however, loses its applicability in hybrid
transactions partaking of incidents of a sale and a service.
7 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REy.

791, 801 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Fall).
8 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
9 In 1966 Dean Prosser found only ten states that had rejected all strict liability
without privity of contract. See Prosser, The Fall, supra note 7, at 797-98.
10 E.g., Foley Corp. v. Dove, 101 A.2d 841 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1954) (supply of
materials incidental to a construction contract, not a sale); Perlmutter v. Beth David
Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash.
2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956) (furnishing of blood by hospital, not a sale).
11 See, e.g., Wm. H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally & Co., 195 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (Ct. C.P. 1963); White
v. Sarasota County, Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So.2d 19 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968); Balkowitsch v.
Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Aegis
Productions, Inc. v. Arriflex Corp. of America, 25 App. Div. 2d 639, 268 N.Y.S.2d 185
(Ist Dep't 1966); Crystal Recreation, Inc. v. Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men, 34 Wash. 2d 553,
209 P.2d 358 (1949).
12 See cases cited note 11 supra.
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The weakness of the sales-service distinction is obvious in the
dichotomy between sales and sales services involving the same product.
For example, had Mrs. Newmark purchased the waving solution from
the hairdresser and applied it herself, there could have been no denial
of a breach of implied warranty if the solution proved defective. Similarly, if Mrs. Newmark had purchased the solution from the hairdresser
and had a neighbor apply it, the hairdresser would have been liable for
breach of implied warranty if the solution were defective. However,
according to the sales-service rule, if she had permitted the hairdresser
to apply the waving solution, she may only recover if the hairdresser is
negligent in the application of the solution. Here she is entitled to no
implied warranty protection. This strange result is due solely to the
former transactions being classified as "sales" while the latter transaction
is considered a "service."' 13
The leading case in which the court did not find a "sale" is
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.14 In that case, a patient sued a
hospital on warranty theory for contracting serum hepatitis15 which resulted from a blood transfusion. The court reasoned that the purpose
of the contract was the care and treatment of the patient and that the
blood supplied was incidental to the service. Therefore, the court held
that the essence of the contract was service, not a sale, hence no warranty
could be implied. 6
The decision in Perlmutterhas been followed consistently through8
out the country in shielding hospitals 17 and blood banks from liability.'
Although the policy behind Perlmutter may be just, the fairness of the
decision and its underlying reasoning are often lost in the process of
stare decisis as Perlmutter is cited in commercial areas for the proposi71 W. VA. L. REv. 213 (1969).
308 N.Y. 100, 125 N.E.2d 792 (1954) (3 judges dissenting).
15 An acute virus inflamation of the liver characterized by jaundice, fever, nausea,
vomiting, and abdominal discomfort---called also catarrhal jaundice, homologous serum
hepatitis, infectious hepatitis. WEBsTrE's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1158 (3d
ed. 1961).
16 508 N.Y. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
17 See Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Lovett v.
Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967); Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves
Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961); Gile v. Kennewick
Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center,
Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964). See also the dissent in Payton v. Brooklyn Hosp.,
21 App. Div. 2d 898, 252 N.Y.S.2d 419 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 610, 224 N.E.2d 891,
278 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1967).
18 See Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (Ct.
App. 1965); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Min. 151,
132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Krom v. Sharp & Dohme, 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.Y.S.2d 99 (3d
Dep't 1958).
13

14
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tion that if service predominates there is no sale and thus no warranty.1 9 Consequently, it becomes an obstacle to the extension of consumer protection through the use of implied warranties.
It should be noted that in a parallel situation, where food is served
for value, there is a sale between the restaurant and its patron under
the implied warranty section of the Uniform Commercial Code.2 0 In
some states prior to the Code this was viewed as a service and not a
sale.2 1 This view prompted a New Jersey court in a recent case to state:
The rule that food served in a restaurant was not impliedly warranted to be fit for human consumption although food sold in a
store was so warranted, had no support in modern concepts of
justice. It was an anachronism. It is unthinkable that such a
legalism should be revived to avoid holding hospitals and blood
banks liable. If these valuable organizations are to be exempted
from liability, the immunity should be based upon the true policy consideration and not upon an irrelevant circumstance. 22
Despite the extension of implied warranties in food cases, the
Uniform Commercial Code has retained the technical requirement of
sale in other analogous transactions. 2 3 However, a cogent argument
may be advanced for the proposition that this long-standing technicality
has little applicability in present-day forms of business enterprise and
should be replaced with a more relevant and logical means of determination. A close examination of the Uniform Commercial Code reveals no requirement that the sale be unaccompanied by a service. To
the contrary, Comment 2 of Section 2-313 provides:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to
warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for
19 See, e.g., Win. H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally & Co., 195 F. Supp. 621, 626
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Aegis Prods., Inc. v. Arriflex. Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 639, 268 N.Y.S.2d
185 (4th Dep't 1966); Ben Constr. Corp. v. Ventre, 23 App. Div. 2d 44, 257 N.Y.S.2d 988
(4th Dep't 1965) (construction of a swimming pool not a sale, thus no warranty). See
also Comment, Sale of Goods in Service-Predominated Transactions, 37 FORDHAM L. REV.
115 (1968).
20 U.C.C., § 2-314(1): Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of
food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
21 See, e.g., Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 A. 805 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927).
22 Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 323-24, 232 A.2d 879, 884 (L. Div.
1967), rev'd, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969) (remanded because record on appeal inadequate for review).
23 See Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (Ct. C.P. 1963). A
case factually on all fours with Newmark in which the court reaches the opposite conclusion. Held that because there was no sale but rather a service there was no warranty
and hence no recovery against the beauty shop operator.
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sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any
way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized
that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to
the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bailments for hire,
whether such bailment is itself the main contract or is merely a
supplying of containers under a contract for the sale of their contents.
It is obvious from the language of this comment that the framers of
the Uniform Commercial Code had no intention of limiting the birth
of implied warranties to transactions which technically met the definition of a sale. This comment seems to suggest that the Code's warranties can be extended into the non-sales area by analogy to the Code
provisions. 24 This contention appears buttressed by the Code's implied
warranty of merchantability which expressly covers the sale of food in
restaurants, 25 a formerly troublesome area caused by the service problem.
In drawing analogies, the courts are best guided by the policy
considerations which have inspired previous developments, and should
not be restricted by the technical rules and definitions inherent in the
warranty rationale. 26 Many cases have stated that the remedies of injured consumers ought not to depend on the intricacies of the law of
sales. 27 The policy reasons for imposing warranty liability in the case
of ordinary sales are equally applicable to a commercial transaction
between a beauty parlor operator and a patron. When a patron places
herself in the hands of the operator, she relies upon his expertise both
in the selection of the products to be used and in the method of using
them. The beauty parlor operator is in a better position than the
customer to discover and control the dangerous condition of the
product, the customer being merely a passive recipient. In addition,
since the beauty parlor operator profits from the transaction, he should
bear the losses incident to the transaction as a risk of his enterprise.
See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLUM. L.
653 (1957).
25 U.C.C. § 2-314(1); see note 20 supra.
26 Among the major policy considerations for implied warranties are: the difficulty
of bringing suit against the distant manufacturer; the difficulty of ascertaining where the
actual fault for defect rests; the superior position of the manufacturer and the seller to
control any dangers which might arise from the use of the goods; and the ability of the
manufacturer and the seller to absorb the costs which arise in connection with the defective products by means of insurance coverage or increase in the selling price. See LaRossa
v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
27 See Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960).
24

REv.
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The particular facts in New mark illustrate well the consumer's interest in imposing strict liability on beauty parlor operators. The
package containing the waving solution carried instructions indicating
that unless precautions were followed, use of the solution could adversely affect certain people. However, the defendant's beauty technician
took no special precautions, and also provided little effective relief
when plaintiff complained of the burning sensation on the top of her
head. Despite these facts, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant
on the issue of the technician's negligence in the performance of the
treatment. 2 Thus, unless defendant can be held liable for breach of
warranty, a helpless plaintiff is left either to bear the burden of the
loss admittedly caused by the administration of a defective product by
defendant's beauty technician, or to attempt expensive litigation for
the second time-this time against the manufacturer of the defective
29
product.
There is little logic in confining the benefits of the Uniform
Commercial Code's implied warranties of quality to strictly sales transactions. Presently, there is liability for services negligently performed
and liability for breach of implied warranty when there is a sale of defective goods. Yet, to say that there is no liability for defective goods
when accompanied by carefully performed services leaves an irreconcilable gap between these two concepts.
Several recent New Jersey decisions demonstrate a departure from
indulging in the technical distinction between sale and service. A significant step was taken in Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, etc.,30 which
involved an action by the employee of a lessee of a "U drive it" truck
against the lessor for alleged breach of warranty because of brake
failure. Prior decisions had made it clear that had Hertz been a manufacturer or dealer it would have been strictly liable for injuries caused
by defects in the trucks it sold. Unable to distinguish between the mass
lessor who puts motor vehicles into the stream of commerce and a
manufacturer or retailer, the court concluded that their liabilities must
be the same. Although there is only a minor distinction between a sale
and a bailment,3' the extension of liability for breach of implied warranty to defendants other than sellers furnished the groundwork for
the elimination of the requirement of a technical sale. This view is in
28 Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (App. Div. 1968).
29 See 47 TExAs L. REv. 716 (1969).
30 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).

31 A sale transfers ownership and possession of the article in exchange for the price;
a bailment for hire transfers possession in exchange for the rental and contemplates
eventual return of the article t9 the owner. Farnsworth, supra note 24, at 655.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

accord with that of English courts which have for years extended im-plied warranties to service transactions. In Watson v. Buckley,3 2 the
defendant used defective lotion in dyeing the plaintiff's hair, resulting
in injuries to plaintiff. The court, admitting that there was no sale,
nevertheless implied a warranty that the materials used were fit for the
purpose. The same reasoning was applied where a defective rod was
installed in an automobile,33 and where defective vaccine was ad34
ministered to cattle.
However, it should not be mistakenly assumed that reasoning by
analogy to the Code means that implied warranties will be extended in
every service transaction. Situations may arise in which policy considerations do not favor the invocation of an implied warranty. An
example is the case of Magrinev. Krasnica,3 wherein the court refused
recovery to plaintiff on the ground of breach of implied warranty
when defendant dentist's hypodermic needle broke in plaintiff's jaw.
There is a vast difference between a doctor and a hairdresser. The
special nature of a doctor's and dentist's services and their relation to
the general welfare far outweighs any need for the imposition on them
of strict liability. The controlling determination is the applicability
of the basic policy considerations underlying the doctrine.
Newmark has carried the trend towards reasoning by analogy a
step further. Whereas Cintrone was only a slight departure, Newmark
brazenly transcends into the realm of service transactions, an area
previously immune from the imposition of implied warranties. And
although this decision is by no means dispositive of the various questions that may arise in this developing area of products liability, its impact appears to be the long overdue abolition of an overworked and
outdated barrier in the field of consumer protection.
1 All E.R. 174, (K.B. 1940).
H. Meyers & Co. v. Brent Cross Service Co., 150 L.T.R. 96, 1 K.B. 46 (1934).
34 Dodd v. Wilson, 2 All E.R. 691 (K.B. 1946).
35 94 N.J. Super 228 (County Ct. 1967), aff'd, sub noma., Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J.
Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
32

33 G.

